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1. Introduction
When people hear about ‘global warming’ or the Kyoto Protocol, many think of a topic of
boundless uncertainty and political controversy. One reason for this reaction is the current U.S.
administration’s statement that ‘Kyoto is dead’ and impossible to implement in the United States.
As the largest greenhouse polluter in the world, the U.S. is indeed vital to any meaningful
attempt to address the certain threat of climate change.1 Yet climate change will not go away
simply because the Bush Administration refuses to sign one particular international accord.
Scientists believe with high certainty that the impacts of current greenhouse gas emissions have
started but may not be completely felt for 100 years or more.2
The long-term nature of the climate problem requires fundamental, long-term changes in how
economies produce goods and services, particularly reductions in the amount of fossil-fuel
energy they use. One of the most likely policies to encourage this transition is a system of
overlapping national and international emissions permits. The Kyoto Protocol would set up such
a system, but even if this Protocol fails, the movement toward a global emissions market is likely
to continue for several reasons. First, all major polluting countries apart from the U.S. have
endorsed the aims and the mechanisms of Kyoto. Second, several countries have already
implemented domestic emissions-trading systems like that proposed in Kyoto, and the entire
European Union is planning to start one in 2005. Third, many large corporations – including the
major European oil companies – have endorsed the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, and some
have initiated their own emissions trading systems. Finally, the idea of trading has strong
American support – the U.S. lobbied tenaciously for the inclusion of a flexible, market-based
structure in the now-controversial Kyoto Protocol.

The world will likely see the emergence of multiple linked markets for
greenhouse gas emissions permits over the next five to ten years.
The world therefore will likely see the emergence of multiple linked markets for greenhouse gas
emissions permits over the next five to ten years. These permits will be assets that have an
economic value and provide economic benefits. Allocating these assets equitably, both across
and within countries, could simultaneously advance environmental protection and reduce
poverty. However, as in any contest over the distribution of wealth, entrenched interests will
ensure that increased equity will not happen spontaneously.
In this paper, we discuss a wide range of institutional structures that could help bring equitable
benefits from this atmospheric asset distribution. First we review the arguments for creating
tradable permits. Then we discuss the implications of the international allocation of emissions
permits, and how a country with an agreed emissions cap can decide to distribute permits within
its borders. Finally, we review some potential obstacles to equitable asset distribution, and
discuss steps that communities, foundations, governments, and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) might take to advance a sustainable and progressive solution to atmospheric emissions.
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2. From Sink to Asset: Approaches to Managing Carbon Storage
2.1 Alternative approaches to reducing environmental damage
Several policy mechanisms exist for reducing the free-ridership and overexploitation associated
with open-access resources. For example, a government with highly structured legal systems and
a powerful enforcement capability might be able to pass legislation or decree that the common
resource shall be shared according to a certain formula set to ensure that the total exploitation is
not at a level that threatens the viability of the resource. Examples include the mandatory
automobile fuel economy standards in the United States, and the maximum automobile emission
allowances implemented in California under the ‘Smog Check’ program. This approach, often
called the ‘command-and-control’ or ‘regulatory’ approach, is attractive in its simplicity, but in a
diverse economy with differing costs of abatement, it can lead to large disparities in the cost of
compliance.
As an alternative to the regulatory approach, the government could set a price for the resource
and then allow producers to decide on their own how much of the resource to consume. This
price can be set directly as a tax (for example, $5 per ton CO2 emitted), or indirectly via a ‘capand-trade’ system in which the government sets a total emission limit and then allows firms and
individuals to buy and sell permits to emit up to this cap (Weitzman 1974). These methods –
taxes, permits, or a hybrid3 of the two – have the potential to reduce the total cost of meeting
environmental targets, since those polluters for whom abatement is cheaper than buying a permit
(or paying the pollution tax) cut emissions, while those for whom abatement is more expensive
pay to continue polluting.
In addition to reducing total cost of compliance, these market-based methods have other
economic and environmental advantages. First, because firms who surpass the requirements that
would have been set by regulation (‘overcomply’) are able to benefit financially, there are
stronger incentives to invest in pollution-control technology. In the long run, this helps push
technological changes that further reduce the cost of compliance. Second, these schemes
establish the principle that the polluter pays for the use of ‘environmental sinks’ – in contrast to
regulatory approaches in which the discharge of wastes into the air or water bodies is free as long
as it remains within prescribed guidelines. This raises the question of who will receive these
payments, or in other words, how is ownerships of environmental sinks to be shared? Depending
on how this questions is answered, market-based methods to pollution reduction could be a
powerful tool for distributional equity, as well as for economic efficiency.
2.2 International emissions permits
Recent international policies to regulate global atmospheric resources the have taken the form of
permit systems. In effect, these define property rights for portions of the commons and assign (or
sell) those rights to emitters. Because the atmosphere provides continuous benefits in the form of
pollution abatement services, it can be thought of as an economic asset that yields dividends to
the planet’s people and organisms. This asset has an enormous value, as these services are
necessary for life. Though some estimates have been made for the value of nature’s services (de
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Groot 1994; Vitousek 1997; Daily 1997), setting precise values is impossible. Given the complex
nature of the earth system, our inability to reach complete scientific understanding of it, and our
inability to predict future human and biospheric needs, we can never know precisely how much
the atmosphere is ‘worth’.
Nevertheless, policies to convert one aspect of the atmosphere – its ability to absorb carbon –
from an open-access resource to a legally recognized and monetized asset will move its price
closer to its fundamental value (at the least, from zero to positive). For this to happen,
governments must elaborate a legal system of tradable emissions rights and distribute the permits
to the entities that will trade them. The most contentious question in developing such a system is
precisely this allocation of emissions rights. Until now everybody has had free access to the
atmospheric pie, so cutting and distributing it is going to lead inevitably to some argument about
who ‘deserves’ a bigger slice.

Until now everybody has had free access to the atmospheric pie, so
cutting and distributing it is going to lead inevitably to some
argument about who ‘deserves’ a bigger slice.
This problem is sometimes cast as a question of whether to allocate permits on the basis of what
countries or industries have emitted in the recent past. This method, often called
‘grandfathering,’ is politically convenient in that large incumbent polluters essentially can
continue with business as usual. However, it also rewards inefficient resource use and ignores the
benefits that have already accrued to users because of their greater use of the common resource.
Another perspective maintains that the atmosphere is a common heritage of humankind and
should therefore be allocated accordingly. Whether this heritage would include the historical
atmospheric debt of industrialized countries is open to debate (Agarwal and Narain 1991; Smith
1991), but at the very least it provides an ethical framework to support an equitable allocation of
current and future use rights, as opposed to a purely grandfathered asset giveaway.
3. Expected Characteristics of the International Carbon Market
3.1 State of international law
Despite doubts arising from the breakdown of international negotiations at the Hague and the
Bush Administration’s declaration of its imminent demise, the Kyoto Protocol seems set to
continue as the international community’s basis for coordinated action. The EU’s 2001
ministerial declaration at Gothenburg, followed by UN meetings in Bonn and Marrakesh, both
framed and approved rules governing emissions trading under the Protocol.
Under this structure, developed country governments (called Annex I Parties) must adhere to
agreed emission limits for the period 2008–2012.4 Table 1 presents these the Kyoto targets,
alongside emissions data for the years 1990 and 2000. These caps reflect a modified version of
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grandfathering, with permits allocated approximately according to each country’s past emissions.
Developing countries do not have targets under the Kyoto Protocol, but they have stated their
willingness to consider the adoption of binding targets once the developed countries have begun
to reduce their own emissions. The type of eventual allocation of permits among developed and
developing countries is still hotly debated.

Table 1. Historical Emissions and Kyoto Protocol Targets
Region

World
Developing countries
Annex I countries
European Union
United States
Non-EU, non-US OECD
Russia and Eastern Europe

Greenhouse Gas Emissions
billion tons CO2e/year
1990
2000
KP Target
21.81
23.63
na
6.92
9.64
na
14.90
13.99
13.46
3.33
3.28
2.76
4.98
5.76
4.55
1.84
2.20
2.05
4.75
2.74
4.19

Sources: Historical emissions are converted from data compiled by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2002) and do not include land-use change (LUC) emissions
arising, for example, from changes in forest cover. Kyoto targets are based on net
emissions reported to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat
(2000) and include LUC emissions. Most Annex I countries reported LUC emissions
ranging between –10% and 10% of reported energy-related emissions; for Annex I as a
whole, LUC amounts to a 10% reduction in energy-related emissions.

Although the Kyoto Protocol has been rejected by the current administration in the United States,
markets for greenhouse gas emissions tied to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) are being introduced. For example, the United Kingdom introduced a voluntary multisector trading plan in early 2002, and Denmark has implemented a mandatory program that
covers the electricity generation sector (Rosenzweig et al. 2002). The European Commission has
introduced a proposal for mandatory multi-sector EU-wide emissions trading starting in 2005.
Furthermore, despite the official United States stance, one of the leading private-sector
contenders for an international carbon exchange was recently established in the Chicago Climate
Exchange. If the Kyoto Protocol ultimately enters into force as expected, these governmental
systems and trading bodies will be linked to a central registry maintained by the FCCC (see
Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of International Emissions Permit Trade
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Note: Gray arrows represent carbon permit flows; thin black arrows represent monetary
flows; thick black arrows represent information sharing. Different country governments
(represented as X, Y, and Z) can decide how to distribute revenue from domestic auctions
or international purchases; in this diagram, Country X has opted for a carbon tax, Country
Y has allocated dividends from the sale of permits to its citizens, and Country Z has
grandfathered its permits to the private sector (‘firms’).

3.2 Estimate of international carbon market size
Several methods exist to characterize the total amount of wealth at stake in these allocation
processes. The most important consideration for the long-term is how much benefit the global
atmosphere provides to humankind by absorbing greenhouse gases. A conservative minimum
estimate of the value of this global ‘atmospheric scarcity rent’ is $100 billion per year.5
In the near term, a crude but simple way to get an idea of the expected order of magnitude of this
market is to take a short time horizon in which the policy context is relatively clear, and multiply
the expected number of permits to be issued by an expected market price. The most pertinent
contemporary example is to take the Annex I emissions limits (shown in Table 1 above),
excluding the United States because of its stated aim to stand clear of the Kyoto Protocol, and
multiply these by an estimated short-term clearing price for carbon.
Modeling studies and historical experience (see Tables 2 and 3) suggest a clearing price
somewhere between $3 and $12 per ton of carbon-dioxide equivalent (CO2e). If we
conservatively assume an expected price at the low end of the scale, given U.S. nonparticipation, we can take $5 per ton of CO2e as a rough approximation. From Figure 1, we can
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see that the non-U.S. Annex I countries have permits totaling approximately 9 billion tons of
CO2e per year.6 Multiplying this by $5/ton, we get a rough estimate of the annual market value
of around $45 billion.
Table 2. Summary of Model Estimates of Global Emissions Market Characteristics
Gases covered

Permit price

Quantity traded

$/ton CO2 2001

Mt CO2

Trade volume
% CDM
billion USD 2001

Study

CO2 only

4-15 (10)

1700-3100 (2400)

7-48 (24)

60-64 (62)

Springer 2001

CO2 only

28

1200

17-34

50

UNCTAD 2000

Six-GHG

3-9 (5)

1600-3000 (2300)

10-14 (12)

56-65 (61)

Springer 2001

Note: Springer (2001) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (2000) reviewed approximately
fifteen existing modeling studies of the near-term carbon market. Most of these studies included the United
States as a consumer of permits; the estimates most likely represent the upper limit on the prices in an ex-U.S.
carbon market. For example, the International Energy Agency (2001) has estimated that U.S. non-participation
will reduce international carbon permit prices by 34 to 90 percent. Averages and standard deviations calculated
by authors. CDM = Clean Development Mechanism (see text for details).

_____________________________________________________
Table 3. Historical Experience with Carbon Prices
Commodity
Annex B VER
Annex B VER
CDM VER
Dutch ERU
Danish Allowance
UK Allowance

Vintage years

Price (US$/tC02e)

1991-2007
2008-2012
2000-2001
2008-2012
2001, 2002
2002

0.60-1.50
1.65-3.00
1.15-3.50
4.40-7.99
2.14-4.17
5.76-9.36

Notes
Vintages before first Kyoto Commitment period
First Kyoto Commitment Period
2002 showed lower peak prices

Note: VER denotes verified emissions reductions; CDM denotes the Clean Development Mechanism; ERU
denotes emission reduction units. Annex B countries are approximately the same as Annex I countries.
Source: Modified from Rosenzweig, Varilek and Janssen (2002).

_____________________________________________________
As an additional indication of the potential size of the market, we can note that private investors
and some governments have already implemented a number of carbon reduction projects to
generate carbon credits. Table 4 presents a sample of such initiatives. Together these projects
represent an investment of over $500 million, which is substantial given that at the time there
were no legally binding carbon-reduction requirements in place; companies were engaging in
projects primarily to learn the regulatory process and hedge their emissions exposure in
anticipation of future regulation.
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Table 4. Examples of Projects to Generate Carbon Credits
Investment type
Pure Carbon Funds
World Bank PCF
ERUPT
Australian GHG Friendly
Private Equity with carbon enhancement
Dexia-FondElec En Eff & Em Redn Fund
Ren En & En Eff Fund
FondElec Latam Clean En Svcs Fund
Black Emerald Leasing
Planned Forestry Funds & Companies
Hancock New Forests Australia
GMO Renewable Resources
COOL
Other Planned
UBS Global Alternative Climate
Natsource

Holdings ($M)

Emphasis

Investors

145
32
varies

Carbon
EE, Cogen, RE, Forest
Landfill Meth, RE, capture, EE

Govt, Private
Govt
Private

CDM & JI
CEE
Australia

63.9
65
25
?

EE
RE, EE in emerging mkts
EE, microgen, RE
RE, Fuelcell, biogas

Multilat, Private
Govt, Private
Private
Private

CEE
Em Mkt
Latam
Europe

200
50
?

sust forest
sust forest
carbon & forestry

Private
Private
Private

Australia
US, CEE, CDM
Latam

carbon
en technology

Private
Private

CDM & JI

50
?

Regions

Note: EE denotes energy efficiency; RE is renewable energy; CEE is Central and Eastern Europe.
Source: Modified from Bürer (2001).

3.3 International carbon capital transfers
Whatever the total size of the market, not all of the emission permits would be traded across
national borders. While we know that countries with high emission abatement costs will be net
purchasers of permits, the long-term cross-border financial flows that would result from this
asset creation are still unclear. Nevertheless, several studies of have elucidated a possible range
of expected international trade. At the low end, Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack (1999), for example,
suggest that only about 6% of the total Annex I permits would be traded internationally; this
calculation, however, was limited to trading within the Annex I group of countries. For global
trading, the results presented in Table 2 indicate a possible range of 1.2-3.1 billion tons (Gt) of
CO2e per year, with a best guess of about 2.4 billion tons per year, equivalent to about 20% of
outstanding Kyoto permits.7 Using our earlier rough estimate of $5/ton as the price, we could
thus expect cross-border activity in the range of $8-$10 billion per year. While this is less than
the total value of the permits, it is nevertheless substantial.

Under a global permit market UNCTAD estimates that
up to $35 billion per year could flow to developing
countries and the former Soviet Union.
Developing countries are particularly interested in how much of these cross-border transactions
might flow to their jurisdictions. The studies summarized in Table 2 indicate that approximately
55-65% of cross-border trades would involve developing countries through the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM is an international institution, established under the
Kyoto Protocol, that helps developed countries implement emissions-reduction projects in the
developing world. Even though the host countries’ emissions are not bound by current
international agreements, they are thus able to add credits to developed countries’ accounts.
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These studies suggest that developing countries could expect to see around half of the crossborder trades, or about $4-5 billion using our conservative estimates.8
Table 5 presents a comparison of some capital flow projections across regions under alternative
trading systems, as estimated by UNCTAD (2000). These figures assume U.S. participation, and
thus the world will likely see lower dollar volumes in the near future. For trading limited to
Annex I, the former Soviet Union could expect to receive up to $10 billion annually. Under a
global permit market – which is unlikely in the near future, but possible, in a decade or two –
UNCTAD estimates that up to $35 billion per year could flow to developing countries and the
former Soviet Union. In the most likely near-term case of limited engagement of developing
countries through CDM, flows could reach $20 billion annually. These numbers are equivalent to
between 2-20% the current net private capital flow to these countries of about $150 billion per
year.
Table 5. Capital Flow Projections by Region and Mechanism
Region
Former Soviet Union
Asia
China
India
Latin Am, Africa, other Non-Annex I
Total Market Value

Trading System
Annex I & FSU Global Market CDM net FDI
flows to region in billion USD 2002
10.5
6.2
5.1
29.1
na
na
na
50.1

11.1
2.9
4.4
34.9

9.0
2.4
4.4
20.3

62.0
159.0

Note: Annex I and Former Soviet Union (FSU) column refers to trading that is limited to those regions;
Global Market column refers to flows expected under a global permit trading system; CDM column refers
to expected flows under Kyoto CDM linked to Annex I emissions trading. Net net foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows to each region are provided for comparison; for the FSU this figure includes Eastern Europe.
Source: Modified from UNCTAD (2000) and Institute of International Finance (2002).

3.4 Long-term carbon market projections
In the near future, then, carbon permits will be a modest but significant source of revenue for
those countries or companies who are able to sell them. Before turning to the design of policies
to distribute this revenue, it is important to consider whether this market will increase
substantially over time. In the future, the number of permits will need to decrease to address the
scientific fundamentals of climate stabilization. To reach a steady state in which human
emissions are balanced by natural uptake, emissions will have to decrease by a further 50% to 10
billion tons of CO2e per year. The associate change in prices and traded quantities will depend on
the degree to which the policy-driven permit scarcity is offset by economic ‘decarbonization’
and technological change. These trends are quite difficult to forecast over decadal time scales,
and so the debate about long-term climate economics continues.
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Figure 2. IPCC Future Scenarios to 2100
IPCC Scenarios: Global Carbon Emissions
30.0

20.0

Growth-Fossil
Growth-Balanced
Growth-GreenTech
Non-Globalized
Global Moderate
Local Moderate

10.0

0.0
1990

2010

2030

2050

2070

2090

Year

Note: Growth-Fossil category plots IPCC scenario A1F1; Growth-balanced=A1B;
Growth-GreenTech=A1T; Non-Globalized=A2; Global Moderate=B1; Local
Moderate=B2).
Source: Modified from Nakicenovic, Nebojsa and IPCC (2000).

The effect of permit scarcity on the size of the market depends on price elasticity of demand for
carbon fuels.9 For example, if the price elasticity of demand is 0.5, then increasing the price of
carbon by 10% would decrease consumption by 5%. In this case, as the number of permits is
reduced, demand pushes up the price of carbon mare rapidly than the quantity falls; thus, fewer
permits end up generating more total revenue. If the carbon revenues are distributed across the
population on an equal per capita basis, as in the Sky Trust system described in the next section,
this means that stricter emissions limits will increase the carbon dividends for majority of
people, thereby generating support for stricter environmental protection.10 In contrast, in a
relatively elastic system (with price elasticity greater than one), a contraction in the number of
permits would not be offset by a commensurate rise in carbon prices, and total carbon revenue
would fall.
In the short run, the capital infrastructure is inflexible and the elasticity is very low. The problem
comes in forecasting this elasticity over the time scale that is meaningful to climate policy,
namely the next 10 to 50 years. Indeed, much of the debate about the costs of compliance with
Kyoto can be understood as a debate over the rate at which the price elasticity of demand can
change (U.S. Department of Energy and Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and
Clean-Energy Technologies 2000; Krause 2000). A related question is how this elasticity varies
between developed and developing countries. The price elasticity is of particular importance in
determining whether an egalitarian distribution of revenues would yield incentives for or against
public support of more fossil fuel reductions: if demand is inelastic, bigger cutbacks generate
larger dividends for redistribution, and hence political support for the repeated tightening of
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standards that would be necessary for ultimate stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations.
Given the uncertainty of future paths, it is useful to specify a range of options that span the
‘reasonable’ set of possibilities. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
conducted such an exercise, producing a set of emissions scenarios under various conceivable
global economic development pathways (Nakicenovic and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Working Group III 2000). Figure 2, which plots six of the main scenarios that span the
range of possibilities, shows that carbon emissions can take widely differing paths depending on
both government policy and market functioning. The uncertainty is greater the further one
projects into the future. In discussing long-term economic impacts, one must therefore remember
that these figures may change dramatically and in unpredictable ways over the coming decades.

4. Distribution of Carbon Revenues
In the short term, the annual carbon market turnover will certainly be noticeable, but not
particularly large relative to the global economy. Nevertheless, given that the natural earth
system can absorb about 10 billion tons of CO2 per year, states will be legislating into existence a
valuable asset. As Victor (2001) has pointed out, the $45 billion annual value calculated above is
just an annual dividend from an asset – the actual sink capacity – of much greater value.
Conservatively assuming that this is a risk-free asset, and taking 5% as the long-term risk-free
rate, this dividend implies an approximate perpetuity value of $900 billion. Though politicians so
far have avoided addressing the long-term ownership of these assets, the next set of international
commitments could begin to recognize more equitable ways of assigning ownership to
atmospheric carbon rights. In this way, negotiators could start to move carbon income away from
arbitrarily chosen historical polluters to a wider and more deliberately chosen set of recipients.
In discussing how potential revenues can be distributed, we need to distinguish between the
international allocation of permits and the intra-national allocation of permits. The international
allocation derives primarily from the UN-sponsored agreements on climate change, including the
Kyoto Protocol; in these agreements, the negotiating groups delineate which parties receive
permits to emit and how much each receives. This process exists to partition rights on a global
basis, recognizing that the atmosphere is a global resource with global access.
However, each individual country then has to decide how to meet their target under the
international regime. Again, countries have the options of mitigating their emissions through
direct regulation, or a market-based system of taxes or permits, or a hybrid. While all these
approaches will likely be used in some form across the 150 or so countries that are expected
ultimately to engage in binding commitments, we will discuss primarily the options for
distributing the revenue that would accrue from sales of permits, both internationally to satisfy
obligations under the UNFCCC and under domestic permit-trading systems.
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4.1 International distribution of carbon revenues.
In principle, permits could be sold directly from one government to another, bought and sold
through a supranational entity. Such an entity could merely serve as a market-maker for trades
between countries, or if vested with the appropriate authority, it could actually distribute the
proceeds from permit sales to the owners of the assets. If one accepts that the atmosphere is
owned equally by individual citizens, a supranational trust would distribute carbon revenue to
those owners. This would be an international version of the ‘Sky Trust’ that has been proposed
domestically for the United States (Kopp et al. 1999; Americans for Equitable Climate Solutions
2000; Barnes and Breslow 2001).
This centralized route has significant logistical and political drawbacks: It would require
international administrative institutions to transfer a large amount of funds, raising sovereignty
concerns that are unlikely to be placated in the foreseeable future. Moreover, most developed
countries would be net ‘losers’ in financial terms – paying more into the trust than they would
receive in dividends – presenting a political obstacle. Thus, while a global trust has theoretical
elegance, in the near term the world will almost certainly see a system of internationally
negotiated permit rights coupled with domestically defined distribution systems.
The discussion of emissions permits revolves primarily around the atmosphere’s capacity to hold
excess carbon. But carbon can also be absorbed and stored in the biosphere – forests and
grasslands particularly. While in theory this ‘carbon sequestration’ is an earth system service that
provides benefits to the entire population, in practice the physical boundaries of terrestrial
biosphere carbon sinks has meant that they have been viewed primarily as property of individual
countries and not part of the international common resource. Thus, under the Kyoto framework,
carbon absorbed by a forest in Sweden can be subtracted against industrial emissions from
Sweden in figuring out its obligations. This raises many questions of equity, especially if
countries are now to be compensated for forest regrowth in the wake of past deforestation
(Agarwal and Narain 1991).
4.2 Domestic distribution of carbon revenues
Once a country has an international allocation, it will be able to buy or sell permits as needed.
Countries that over-comply with their cap or that host credit-generating projects will be able to
generate revenue through the international market for greenhouse gas emissions permits.
Furthermore, countries that implement a domestic system of tradable permits or carbon fees will
generate revenues at home. It is important to note that individual countries are not forced to wait
for an international allocation (à la Kyoto) to implement a domestic system: as sovereign states,
they can decide on emissions targets unilaterally or in smaller groups.
Regardless of the origin of the international framework, once a country decides to raise carbon
prices to control greenhouse gas emissions, it has three broad options for distributing the
resulting revenue within its borders:
•

Retain in governmental budget
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•
•

Distribute to corporations doing business in country
Distribute to citizens or residents

In the government option, the revenues from carbon taxes or permit sales go to the treasury and
become part of the budget. The distributional outcome thereby becomes subject to the political
process of the country. The government could decide to tap the carbon revenue for its
discretionary budget. Alternatively it could use the revenue to reduce other tax burdens, either
targeting specific industries or citizens or as a broad-based tax cut. In the United States, for
example, possibilities include social security payroll tax reductions and cuts in corporate income
taxes (Phillips 2001; U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2001).
If the country decides to grant permits directly to corporations, as part of a grandfathered
allocation, these private entities are able to continue their previous emissions free of charge. This
policy effectively grants corporations ownership of the GHG revenue stream. While the
government may recoup some of this revenue through taxes or a hybrid permit auction, the
remaining revenue accrues to the corporation, and, by extension, to its owners.
The third option is to distribute the benefits directly to the people of the country. This
distribution could take two forms:
•
•

A periodic distribution of dividends accruing from the national sale of permits
(Barnes 2001).
A one-time distribution of ‘emission endowments’ that provide periodic dividends
and are assets that can be traded on a secondary market (McKibben and Wilcoxen
1999).

Each of these could be distributed universally with each citizen getting an equal share, or in
some other way that might, for example, address economic hardships due to climate change
policies or actual climate change. Sky trusts are a universal mechanism for distributing
dividends.
Hybrid schemes are possible. For example, the government could retain a fraction of sky-trust
revenue to invest in renewable energy research and development and adjustment programs for
workers in carbon-intensive industries that are rendered less competitive by having to pay for
their environmental externalities.
Multiple national sky trusts would have several attractions. First, the majority of people would be
net winners in purely financial terms, receiving more in annual dividends than they would pay in
higher carbon prices. This enhances their political viability. Second, low- and middle-income
households tend to be net winners, while high-income (and high-consumption) households tend
to pay more into the fund then they get back in dividends. The sky trust thus has a progressive
impact on income distribution (Barnes and Breslow 2001). Third, multiple national sky trusts
would not be dependent on painstakingly developing an international consensus on the
procedures and institutions necessary to allocate emission rights internationally. Fourth, they
would be compatible with an equitable international allocation that could be negotiated during
the second, third, or later commitment periods under the UNFCCC. Fifth, national sky trusts
potentially could serve to refine administrative procedures through institutional experimentation
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and learning. Finally, a system of functioning national sky trusts could serve as a stepping stone
to an eventual global sky trust.
5. Perspectives on the distribution options
One can evaluate these alternative carbon asset distribution options from many perspectives. In
this section, we briefly discuss four perspectives: ethical, legal, economic, and political.
5.1 Ethical perspectives
The ethical argument has been spelled out extensively by ecological economists, environmental
thinkers, political scientists, and legal scholars, among others. The basic idea is simple: that the
atmosphere, as a global common resource, should be shared equitably among the people of the
world. With this overarching framework, two questions are whether natural debts incurred in the
past should be included in this equitable sharing; and whether ‘equitable’ means equal per capita
allocation or should incorporate other economic criteria as well.

The atmosphere, as a global common resource, should be shared
equitably among the people of the world.
Within the scholarly debates on ethical perspectives, nobody argues explicitly for grossly
unequal distribution of rights to the atmosphere. Some do, however, advance the argument that
some element of grandfathering can have theoretical as well as pragmatic benefits. The argument
is basically that resources that in the past have been free should not be burdened suddenly with a
high cost, as the resource users were operating in a legal and scientific world that did not
recognize any limit. Thus their ethical obligation begins from the point of learning and
recognition, not from the point of causation.
5.2 Legal perspectives
A related argument has been advance by legal theoreticians. The principal question is whether
existing international law provides an adequate foundation for the concept of the atmosphere as
the ‘Common Heritage’ of humankind, or merely a weaker ‘Common Concern’ of humankind.
(Baslar 1998; Arend 1999). Some precedents for the former exist in the treatment of common
resources under international environmental law, such as the Antarctic Treaty and Amendments,
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the conventions governing lunar mineral
exploitation. Existing legal instruments and decisions do not necessarily imply a universal right
to the benefits of the atmosphere, and there is even some disagreement as to whether the
atmosphere meets the legal definition of a commons (Buck 1998). Nevertheless, the precedents
are encouraging in that the international community has explicitly delineated the common
ownership of other shared resources.
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5.3 Economic perspectives
One objection to the option of granting permits to corporations free of charge is that not all
people are managers or shareholders. Consumers may capture some surplus via the lower prices
that firms could charge, but owners could appropriate a large part of this windfall. Furthermore,
any surplus passed along the consumers get would not be equally distributed: Those who
consume more (typically, high-income households) would reap more than those who consume
less (typically, lower-income households). Thus, granting free permits to corporations would
probably end up enriching those who already have substantial wealth, without providing much
benefit to the ‘average’ citizen who arguably has an equally legitimate claim to the atmosphere.
The sky trust proposal differs from a corporate allocation in three ways:
•
•

•

First, by allocating an equal share to each person, the sky trust embodies a specific ethical
judgment regarding entitlements.
Second, the sky trust has a payout ratio – the fraction of revenues that is returned to
shareholders as dividends after other costs are paid – that is extremely high relative to the
payout ratio of a typical corporation. Proposed payout ratios in sky trusts vary from 75%
to 100%; whereas corporate payout ratios are often less than 10%.11
Third, most sky trust proposals provide for an equal dividend to everybody, without
giving individuals the option of either buying or selling their entitlement.

While necessarily initiated through the national legislative process, such a system could be
separated from the government.
From an economic perspective, if one could somehow demonstrate that the government can use
the revenue more effectively than individuals, then the government should retain the revenue.
Defining ‘effectiveness’ for governments is a difficult task, and given the mixed record of
government spending, one must make a strong case for governmental retention of carbon
revenues. One area that is particularly compelling, however, is government-sponsored research
and development: because private firms often cannot capture the full benefits of innovations,
government sponsorship to yield public spillover benefits has been repeatedly vindicated (Duke
and Kammen 1999).
Specifically, carbon revenue could be used for investment in developing longer-term approaches
for reducing carbon emissions. Currently the United States, for example, arguably under invests
in alternative energy research and development. Federal investments in all energy research
amount to less than 0.4% of U.S. energy revenues, compared to over 12% in many areas of the
life-sciences (Kammen and Margolis 1999). Using even a small fraction of the carbon revenue
could create more opportunities for the shift to renewable energy, and thus make further
reductions in carbon emissions more likely (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2001; U.S.
Department of Energy and Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and CleanEnergy Technologies 2000). In addition, targeting some carbon revenue for governmentalsponsored adjustment assistance could mitigate social problems caused by reduced use of fossil
fuels.
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5.4 Political perspectives
The political argument over distribution mechanisms will pit strong ethical arguments against
entrenched economic interests. One likely compromise is to divide the problem into short and
long time horizons. In the short-term, this would allow atmospheric dividends to continue to
accrue mainly to those who enjoy them now (mostly corporations based in developed countries)
while moving toward a more equitable long-term redistribution of rights (Kinzig and Kammen
1998; Baer et al. 2000).
If it is decided that atmospheric carbon revenue should be distributed directly to citizens, the
possible pitfalls of distribution mechanisms take on greater importance. Without a strong legal
and administrative system, the money may not reach its rightful owners, either because the
infrastructure (records, registries, banks, etc.) is not in place to deliver it, or because
knowledgeable insiders divert the cash from the intended recipients. In such cases, it is possible
that alternative institutional arrangements can achieve a partial distribution of carbon income
while maintaining integrity. For example, the Bonn Agreements and Marrakesh Accords to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change establish an Adaptation Fund which is to draw
funding from a tax on Clean Development Mechanism projects. Decisions adopted at Marrakesh
also direct the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to help fund capacity building and
technology transfer in developing countries. Recycling carbon revenue through the Adaptation
Fund or earmarked GEF money would redistribute wealth to poorer countries and provide a
source of funds for climate-friendly sustainable development.
6. Conclusions
Current trends are hard to extrapolate, but we believe that the politics of atmospheric rights could
realign behind a more equitable allocation. To argue that the revenue from higher carbon prices
should be distributed directly to citizens, one needs to be demonstrate one or more of the
following: (a) the right to share in carbon revenue stems from an ethical argument based on
common ownership; (b) the citizens can use the money more effectively than the government;
and (c) the political landscape is sufficiently malleable to make this a reality.
Regarding the international allocation of rights, without a strong international norm that prods
countries to adopt an egalitarian distributional standard, it is hard to imagine that more than a
few industrialized countries would willingly cede the large sums of cash implied in an
international allocation scheme based on equal per-capita emissions rights. Longer-term equity is
not a pipe dream, and would require a fuller development of an international norm that defines
the atmosphere as the common heritage of humankind.
Regarding the allocation of rights and revenues within countries, a system of national sky trusts
could provide a means for ensuring that atmospheric scarcity rent flows to the poor as well as the
rich. By constructing a legal endowment in the natural asset of the atmosphere, such a system
could align environmental protection with wealth creation for the poor. We have noted several
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administrative and political obstacles to implementing an interlocking system of national sky
trusts. Even if this goal proves unattainable in the short term, smaller steps can help move toward
this ideal of harmonizing environmental protection and poverty reduction via the definition of
natural assets.
Governments have primary, but not exclusive, power over the both international allocation and
domestic distribution policies. As a first step, governments should define and defend their own
long-term positions on equity questions – for example, by agreeing to the principle of equalizing
per-capita emissions rights over time. Such actions can help to build consensus and cooperation
for the longer term, and potentially make room for more compromise in the shorter term. NGOs
can press domestically for international agreements delineating the principle of universal human
ownership of the atmosphere (Schreurs and Economy 1997). This strategy of norm definition has
worked well for some other issues as in the international campaign to ban land mines, in which
intensive lobbying based upon ethical grounds was able to bolster a new area of international law
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Philanthropic foundations with a charter to support equity,
human rights, and environmental protection can target this area of climate policy as a long-term
goal. Local communities also can participate in the process, in particular by showing their
national governments that cutting emissions is not only possible but economically desirable.
International and domestic climate change policies that define and allocate rights to emit carbon
are already beginning to emerge. By moving toward a more equitable international allocation,
and by implementing domestic revenue distribution policies that focus on citizens, government
research and development, and adjustment assistance, these policies could simultaneously build
wealth for the poor and reduce the risk of overexploiting the atmospheric commons. The result
can be both a sustainable and a progressive solution to global climate change.
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Endnotes
1

Human-caused climate change is a certain threat. Scientists know with high precision the
mechanisms for direct warming of the atmosphere due to changes in gas concentrations. The
main uncertainties relate to the patterns and timing of its impacts.

2

Though we refer primarily to the predominant anthropogenic greenhouse gas of carbon dioxide,
and often use ‘carbon’ as shorthand, the theoretical concepts developed here can include the nonCO2 greenhouse gases as well. Accordingly, we adopt the common designation of ‘CO2equivalent’, or CO2e, to refer to greenhouse gases as a whole.
3

For example, to mitigate the price uncertainty under a cap-and-trade system, the government
can set a ceiling for the carbon price by implementing a fixed penalty rate. Denmark is using this
type of system for its domestic carbon permit plan.
4

Annex I is a designation in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and
reproduced in the Kyoto Protocol as Annex B. Annex I countries are: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Ukraine, and U.S.A..
5

Barnes and Breslow (2001) perform a similar calculation for the United States, using a much
higher carbon price. Our $100 billion figure uses a carbon price of around $5/ton CO2e, and
assumes that this would cut emissions to a near-term target of 21.81 billion tons/year globally.

6

In the language of the international agreements, the term ‘quantified emission limitation and
reduction obligation’ is sometimes used as longhand for ‘permits’.

7

This figure includes the U.S. permits to be consistent with the models’ assumptions.

8

Again, the studies in Table 2 assume U.S. participation.

9

Elasticity is defined as the percentage change in consumption divided by the percentage change
in price. Things that are more ‘necessary’, such as basic foods and energy, tend to have lower
elasticity than luxury items, which can be more easily foregone if prices rise.
10

Elasticities are not constant over demand, and would likely become smaller as the quantity of
permits decline, enhancing this effect.

11

A 75% payout ratio results from earmarking 25% of the proceeds for renewable energy R&D,
adjustment assistance, and so on.
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